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Military historian Cliff Simons says one of the inspirations for Soldiers, Scouts and Spies was 
“hearing a well-known Pākehā host on national radio vehemently declare that ‘Māori never 
lost a battle’” during the New Zealand Wars (21). At its launch, fellow military historian 
Richard Taylor described the new book as a “watershed publication” that marked a new era in 
research on the New Zealand Wars, supplanting the allegedly flawed work of James Belich.1 
It is a bold claim to make for a history of the role of military intelligence in some (but not all) 
of the conflicts fought between 1845 and 1864, especially given the omission of all of the wars 
fought after that date through until 1872. Simons himself makes some further claims for the 
work, suggesting that his own background as an officer in the New Zealand Army gives him 
special insights into the wars not available to other historians and writers from a non-military 
background.  
 
Another way of situating the work might be to see it as part of an already fairly substantial 
body of literature on the wars seeking to challenge or dismantle various aspects of Belich’s 
findings. Nothing gets a New Zealand military historian more worked up than talk of trench 
warfare, and Simons rehearses the usual arguments against Belich’s claims that Māori had 
invented the modern version of this later seen on the Western Front during World War One. 
He goes further than that, suggesting that Pākehā may have aided Māori in the design of their 
fortifications—in this way repeating a familiar allegation levelled by nineteenth-century British 
military officers based in New Zealand, who often refused to believe that Māori could have 
constructed their various intricate pā without secret assistance from European military 
engineering experts.  
 
In this way, Simons’ work is not so much a portent of the future of New Zealand Wars research 
as a return to some older Pākehā tropes and interpretations. And that is reflected in other ways 
as well. Simons even claims that “Māori Wars” or “Maori Land Wars” are the most commonly 
used terms for these conflicts today (17). That might have been the case half a century ago but 
hardly withstands serious scrutiny any more. And Simons’ description of the mid-nineteenth 
century Māori world as “a still largely subsistence society” could not be further from the truth 
(12). A failure to understand the scale of Māori economic activity and achievement in the two 
decades after 1840 can easily lead one to underplay the extent of the losses endured as a result 
of war and confiscation in the 1860s. Entire communities had their economic infrastructure 
stripped away or destroyed. That left a lasting and deeply negative legacy for the whānau and 
hapū concerned. 
 
There are other ways in which Simons’ failure to engage more deeply with the existing 
historiography manifests itself. He argues (against Belich) that Crown forces secured a decisive 
victory at Ruapekapeka in January 1846. It was no coincidence, he suggests, that when military 
settlements known as the Fencibles were established after 1847 they all faced south towards 
Waikato since it was “not considered necessary to protect the nation’s capital from Ngāpuhi in 
the north because they were thought to have been pacified and no longer constituted a military 
threat” (162). He appears unaware of the fact that a settlement of Fencibles was initially 
planned for Kerikeri, in the Bay of Islands. That location was abandoned after Hone Heke 
effectively vetoed the idea, leaving the Crown to focus on areas closer to Auckland. One 
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newspaper wag had suggested that any such settlement further north would more appropriately 
be called the “Defencelessibles.”2 The absence of military settlements in the north was, in other 
words, not a reflection of Grey’s magnanimity to his defeated foes but further evidence of the 
Crown’s failure to impose its authority over the north in the wake of Ruapekapeka. 
 
The John Gorst-generated myth of a Kīngitanga (Māori King movement) deeply divided 
between a “moderate” faction led by Wiremu Tamihana and an “extremist” one under Rewi 
Maniapoto is repeated for the umpteenth time, despite lacking any real credibility when 
subjected to serious examination. That feeds into another retro element of his analysis. 
Historians, Simons says, “have never felt particularly comfortable about gauging how close 
Auckland came to being attacked by the Kingites in July 1863” (269). That the “extremist” 
faction of the Kīngitanga was about to attack Auckland under Rewi Maniapoto’s leadership 
and massacre its residents was the justification employed by Governor Grey in July 1863 for 
launching a preemptive Crown attack on Waikato. Rewi Maniapoto was returning from a tangi 
in Taupō when British troops crossed the Mangatāwhiri River and commenced their invasion—
surely the wrong place to be if he was intent on destroying Auckland. Grey’s supposed evidence 
of an imminent Kīngitanga assault on the township was exposed more than fifty years ago by 
historian Brian Dalton as little more than feeble justifications for a predetermined war of 
conquest.3 More recently, it has been shown that an ultimatum to Waikato demanding they 
comply with Crown demands or suffer the consequences was still being drafted after the 
invasion had already commenced.4 
 
What followed was devastating for those on the receiving end of British bullets. The suggestion 
(quoting Taylor) that Rangiaowhia, attacked early on a Sunday morning on 21 February 1864, 
was a “legitimate target” entirely ignores the fact that it was not a fighting pā but an open, 
undefended village whose residents—mostly women, children and elderly men—had been led 
to believe that it was a place of sanctuary (316). As military historian Chris Pugsley notes, what 
happened at Rangiaowhia was “the inevitable consequence of soldiers attacking an unarmed 
settlement and finding nothing to fight but families.”5 
 
The failure to engage with Māori responses to the attack on Rangiaowhia is symptomatic of an 
overall approach that tends to privilege Pākehā perspectives. Simons does offer some useful 
insights on matters of military intelligence, highlighting, for example, that “colonial warfare 
was not taught in the war colleges,” so that officers arriving in New Zealand were forced to 
confront an unfamiliar enemy and environment (51). Overall, however, the book fails to live 
up to the grand predictions made for it at launch. There remain many dimensions of the New 
Zealand Wars that require further investigation, and while Soldiers, Scouts and Spies highlights 
the importance of military intelligence in these conflicts, it is not likely to replace Belich’s The 
New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict as the preeminent work 
on them anytime soon. 
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